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Why? Why bother? Why me? Why you?
-Working conditions have improved enormously
-But risk acceptability has also changed greatly
-Accident numbers are decreasing, but still high
-You are the generation that shapes the future
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3Fontes/Entidades: Eurostat | Entidades Nacionais, PORDATA
http://www.pordata.pt/Europa/Acidentes+de+trabalho+graves+e+mortais-1355
AGENDA
4
1. Basic definitions & terminology
2. Models of accident causation
3. Methods of accident investigation and analysis
4. Fundamentals of RIAAT process for dealing with accidents at work
OBJECTIVE
To address ways of investigating and analysing accidents that 
also promote organisational learning and, therefore, are aligned 
with modern safety management thinking.
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1. Basics & terminology (1)
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Accident
 Randomness / unplanned / sudden event
 Energy transfer (some kind of “contact”)
 Specific consequence: injury to people, damage to property  
or the environment
Near-miss or dangerous occurrence
Undesired occurrence that may have had critical effects, i.e., the damaging 
consequences are not actually present – it only has the potential to cause them.
1. Basics & terminology (2)
Investigation – means a search for factual accident data; implies 
a systematic search of the relevant facts; it is essentially about 
fact-finding and the identification of observable elements (data)
Analysis – holds the need to interpret data and to establish 
causal links
>> search for logical explanations rather than facts and events 
>> a certain amount of information might be inferred
Investigation and Analysis can be seen as iterative processes, 
which are complementary to each other 
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1. Basics & terminology (3)
Learning
“the processes related to establishing new knowledge 
aiming to implement changes to, or gaining deeper 
comprehension of, and/or confirming the basis for current 
practices” (Njå & Braut, 2010)
learning implies change
8
2. Models of accident causation
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Accident Prevention
relationship between models and methods  
Models (theories)
Methods (tools) 
Risk Assessment
(pro-active monitoring) 
Accident Investigation & Analysis
(reactive monitoring) 
To explain the accident mechanism (causation theories) 
To help a user performing a specific task
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Multi – causality (current approaches)
Not a single cause (or a single sequence), but 
rather the interaction of multiple causes
Turner (1978) –
Incubation/Trigger 
Event Theory
Sequential – chain of events Epidemiological
Reason (1990, 1997)
“Swiss Cheese” Model 
Organisational Accidents 
Systems approach
Rasmussen (1997)
Svedung & Rasmussen (2002)
Haddon (1973)
Energy model
Kjellén (1984)
Deviation model
Heinrich (1931) – Domino theory
Bird (1974) – Loss Control 
(modified domino)
Review of Models – some milestones
Reason model (1997) – Organisational Accidents
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We find multiple failures within an organisation. When combined with each 
other, these failures can result in an accident
Active Failures – their effects are felt immediately. They play an “active” 
roll on the accident occurrence. Usually are easy to identify and represent 
the “immediate causes”
e.g.: technical failure from equipment or materials, or human error from 
worker, 
Reason model (1997) – Organisational Accidents
Key concepts
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Latent failures (or latent conditions) – their pernicious consequences 
are not immediately visible, and are not immediately associated with the 
accident
These are normally weaknesses in the organisation which facilitate the 
occurrence of active failures. They can be “dormant” in the system for long 
periods without being detected. Only become evident in the aftermath of an 
accident, when combined with other factors 
e.g.: insufficient supervision, poor maintenance,  ill designed machines or 
tools, bad procedures, poor management, etc. 
Reason model (1997) – Organisational Accidents
Key concepts
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In summary: the model considers 3 levels of concern:
1- Organisation & management: the weak points within the organisation –
the latent conditions
2- Working environment: it will influence or promote unsafe behaviours
3- People: unsafe acts, or behaviours from workers
These factors, combined with technical failures and poor barriers (defences) 
can result in an accident or near-miss
Reason model (1997) – Organisational Accidents
Key concepts
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Physical
Fences, machine guards, electrical 
insulation, gas detectors, ventilation 
systems, PPE, etc.  
Most commonly >> “active” failures
Reason model (1997)
Administrative
Norms, warnings, rules, safety procedures, 
work permits, etc. 
Most commonly >> “latent” conditions
Failures in defences can contribute in various ways: absence, existing but not 
known by workers, bad use, insufficient, bad design (difficult to use or 
uncomfortable)
Barriers / Defences
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3. Methods of accident 
investigation
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Relationship between methods and underlying models
Source: adapted from Katsakiori et al. / Safety Science 47 (2009), pp 1007–1015
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Investigation and Analysis of Accidents – accidents at work
Investigating Accidents and Incidents – Users Manual – Guidance HSG245 (2004) 
http://www.hsebooks.com/Books/
3CA (Control Change Cause Analysis) - Users Manual (2002 and 2009) published 
by NRI. http://ww.nri.eu.com
WAIT - Work Accidents Investigation Technique. Verlag Dashofer (2003, 2011 4ª Ed.)
adopted by the Portuguese Labour Inspectorate for official enquiries on serious accidents 
English version: http://xenofonte.demi.fct.unl.pt/wait_method 
RIAAT - Recording, Investigation and Analysis of Accidents at Work (2010)
Proj. CAPTAR:  http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/captar/    (adopted by the Portuguese Labour Inspectorate)
RCA - Root Cause Analysis (Análisis de Causa Raíz). 2015.
AENOR: Norma UNE-EN 62740:2015
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4. “RIAAT in a nutshell”
 just a brief outline of the RIAAT Process
functions: Recording, Investigation and Analysis of Accidents 
 it is a Process (or procedure) to deal with accidents at work 
 accommodates the whole cycle of accident information
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• To prevent, one needs to know (i.e., understand 
the phenomena; have reliable information )
• Learning also implies the ability of new 
knowledge to convey changes and 
improvements where they are actually 
needed 
• Knowing assumes learning
• The effect is amplified when learning 
is shared across the organisation 
(organisational learning) 
Motivation for RIAAT – move from “records” to (safety) 
learning and improvement
Basic Postulates
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Background / Development philosophy 
RIAAT
Legal requirements
(information on AW)
State of Art 
Current Practice
State of Art 
Theory
(literature review) 
RIAAT resulted from the intersection of three main areas of knowledge
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Background ... Reason’s theory
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Summary of RIAAT
 
Management Process, materialised by two instruments: 
- a FORM (standard form). The methodology of analysis is embedded in the 
form (6p)
-A User’s Manual (15p); step-by-step guidance
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FORM: simple, practical and structured
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(1) Recording / Registration
(2) Investigation & Analysis
(3) Action / Correction
(4) Learning / Sharing
Accidental event   
(input)
Safety improvement 
(output)
A “process” in 4 parts
The term process implies:
 a set of related activities
 transformation (inputs & 
outputs are different)
 obtaining added value
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Part 1 – Recording
 plain record of the accident or dangerous 
occurrence; it states the basic facts and 
circumstances
 The form is self-explanatory;  and all one 
needs to do is filling in the applicable fields 
(Sections 1-3). 
 This first part of the process is aligned 
with the ESAW / EEAT methodology 
(Eurostat)
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Part 1 (optional in step 2.4) – Recording of Active Failures
Active Failures are many and diverse 
Can be classified into 5 main categories (WAIT, 2011)
HUM – Human (behaviour, actions)
E&B – Equipments & Buildings (equipments, tools, structures, buildings, etc.)
HAZ – Hazards (hazardous substances, energies, materials and objects, etc.)
LOR – Living Organisms (animals, plants, micro organisms, etc.) 
NAT – Natural Phenomena (when they are a direct cause in the accident)
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Nature of active failures
(1) HUM – actions and behaviours
Bad movements; inopportune 
False moves
Slips, trips, falls (STF)
Excessive force; Cargo handling
Driving (dangerous) of vehicles or machines
Using tools (misuse, unknowing)
Loss control of a tool, or object, 
or machine
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(2) E&B – Equipment & Buildings (structures).
Structural collapse: scaffolding, platforms
Breaking, bursting: cables, ropes
Vehicles in movement (poor condition)
Equipment and tools (defective)
Batteries, generators, electrical equipment
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(3) HAZ – Hazards
Hazardous materials and substances
Flammable or explosive substances
Radioactive Materials
Particles, dust, debris, fragment
Sharp objects
Loads suspended or transported
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(4) LOR – Living Organisms
Micro organisms: bacteria, viruses, bacilli
Animals: dog bite, mouse, snake
Insects: wasp sting, bee (acute allergic reaction)
Vegetation, trees: fall, tripping, allergic contact
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(5) NAT – Natural phenomena 
Characteristics of the land: holes, caves, 
abrupt slopes, trenches, water courses, etc. 
(fall, landslide)
Soil and slippery surfaces: snow, ice, mud, etc. 
(paths conditions and / or excavation sites)
Work under adverse 
climatic conditions: 
intense sun, rain, 
hail, strong winds, 
electric shock, 
storms, etc.
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Adapted model
- A new “external layer” to account for OSH legal requirements 
- In the spirit of the law, this is the first group of barriers 
(immaterial barriers, which need to be well implemented)
Part 2 of RIAAT – Investigation & Analysis (causes)
The OSH Legislation
People
Workplace Factors
Management & Organisational Factors
Accident
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Part 2 – Investigation & Analysis (causes)
Search in 4 layers – the causes of the accident and also all underlying factors (latent) 
that facilitated its occurrence 
•People (actions; behaviours)
•Accident 
•Workplace Factors
•Management Factors; 
Organisational 
•OSH Legislation
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3 níveis 
análise
!
Part 2 – how much effort?
Basic 
Medium 
In-depth
Likely to result in a more serious 
injury?  Potential for learning?
Investigation level 
(decision)
Basic
(Parts I & Part III of the 
process, only)
Medium
(Adjust Part II to your 
needs)
Medium
(Adjust Part II to your 
needs)
In-Depth 
(Apply full process)
In-Depth 
(Apply full process)
Learning
Potential?
Learning
Potential?
Learning
Potential? 
YES
LO
HIGH
LO
HIGH
HIGHYES
YES
(by default)
Minor / 
Superficial?
(no lost time)
Fatal or 
Serious?
LTI (Lost Time 
Injury)?
NO
NO
Start
Actual Injury
Decision tree for deciding the level of 
investigation 36
The Manual provides 
classification lists for each 
category of factors
Analysis of Human Failures 
and Individual factors - IND
Workplace Factors - WPF
1
2
Part 2 – Investigation & Analysis (causes)
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Analysis of human failures (errors & violations)
 
Unsafe 
Acts 
Errors [1] 
Violations [2] 
(Intended action) 
Slips & Lapses [1A] 
(Unintended action - automatic 
mode) 
Mistakes [1B] 
(Intended action) 
Routine - “to cut corners” 
Optimisation 
Necessary 
Exceptional 
Slips - Attentional failures 
Lapses - Memory failures 
Rule-based Mistakes (type R) 
Misapplication of a good rule 
Application of a bad rule 
Knowledge-based Mistakes (type K) 
Takes many variable forms 
Human Error Types/ taxonomy (adapted from Reason, 1990, p.207) 38
Reason classification for error types
Error Types
The error types can be classified into the following levels of “cognitive performance”:
Slips and Lapses – Unintended actions. Slips refer to attentional or perceptual failures 
in observable actions, while lapses are internal mental events, generally involving 
memory failures.
Rule-based mistakes (R type) – Intended actions. These errors are “mistakes” 
associated with behaviors that require application of rules or procedures. A typical 
question to make to characterize performance at this level is whether the procedure or 
rule exists.
Knowledge-based mistakes (K type) – These errors are “mistakes” at the level of 
individual knowledge; they occur when a worker faces new situations, for which he has 
no rules or applicable knowledge. These are linked, for instance, with difficult diagnosis.
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Management & 
Organisational 
Conditions – M&O
Legal OSH 
(legislation)
4
3
Part 2 – (continuation)
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Part 3 – Plan of Action 
Aim
1) To ensure that all applicable Risk Assessments (RA) are complete
and/or are reviewed in the light of this particular case
2) To establish an adequate (and sufficient) Plan of Action, based on 
“ALARP” – As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
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The ALARP  principle
Prevention and Protection measures should help to reduce risk to a level 
“As Low As Reasonably Practicable” 
® Celeste Jacinto (FCT / UNL)
protection
prevention
Acceptable 
risk
Unacceptable
risk 
probability
seriousness
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Part 4 – Learning cycle
Aim
1) To ensure that the important lessons are extracted and that 
knowledge is used. In this section, the RIAAT Form prompts the 
investigator to answer two key questions: 
What was the lesson? Why? Who did learn?  
2) To make sure that the important lessons are shared with targeted 
people. Whom to share? How?
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5. Concluding Remarks
Literature is plenty of ideas, new standards, new methods, 
new ways, etc.,
There is no excuse for not doing it, but methods are there to 
help, not to dictate rules
The effort is worth doing only if it means learning 
Accident Investigation & Analysis
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Accident Investigation and Analysis
Thank you for your attention
Celeste Jacinto (mcj@fct.unl.pt) 
Industrial Engineering, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Thematic Seminar presented at 
Universitad de Málaga
28 November 2016
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